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The Invention of Creativity: the Emergence of a Discourse 
 
Abstract 
 
Creativity is increasingly cited as the key to social and economic change in the 21st 
century. It is also a very modern concept — making its first appearance as an English 
noun in 1875. This paper investigates the cultural construction of creativity in the 
context of the history of ideas. It understands creativity not as a given human attribute 
or ability, but as an idea that emerges out of specific historical moments, shaped by the 
discourses of politics, science, commerce, and nation. It shifts the ground of analysis 
away from the naturalised models that have traditionally dominated the field of creative 
practice research, in order to highlight the historicity of a concept that is more 
commonly deemed to be without history.  
 
There are few English nouns that have generated such relentlessly good publicity as the 
word ‘creativity’. It is increasingly found scattered across the literature of the arts and 
sciences, industry, business management, information technology, education and 
government. It has been called the key to economic growth, the ‘decisive source of 
competitive advantage’, and the ‘very heart’ of ‘wealth creation and social renewal’.i It 
is also a burgeoning object of study in the humanities, where it is increasingly applied 
across spheres and disciplines, most notably in the new interdisciplinary schools of 
Creative Industries or Creative Practices (incorporating younger disciplines such as 
Media Arts Production and Writing), as well as in the mainstream of the traditional 
humanities in the rhetoric of the ‘New Humanities’.ii 
 
Given the recent surge of interest in creativity, it is surprising that from a cultural 
historical perspective the idea of creativity remains under-examined. Though the 
products of creativity have spawned a rich and diverse literature – including scholarly 
studies of both creative individuals and their works – much of this work is concerned 
with examining the end product of creativity (the finished art object) and its circulation 
in discourse, rather than the idea or process of creative production itself. Conversely, 
while the concept of creativity as a psychological and even biological attribute has 
become an object of intense interest in the cognitive sciences, these scientific 
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approaches to creativity tend to overlook that which is specifically modern, cultural, 
historical, and indeed profoundly political in the constitution of their object of inquiry. iii 
 
Perhaps one of the most suggestive properties of the word creativity is the late date of 
its emergence — making its first appearance as an abstract English noun in 1875, before 
entering into common usage a half century later.iv Though Raymond Williams has 
argued that the antecedents of the discourse are to be discerned in European culture 
since the Renaissance — for example, Williams cites Shakespeare as one of the first 
English writers to apply the word creation to human imagination, but this was, to quote 
Macbeth, in the largely negative sense of ‘A Dagger of the Mind, a false Creation, 
Proceeding from the heat-oppressed Brain’.v The concept of imagination as productive 
and positive that is entangled in the modern meaning of the word is difficult to sustain 
in any popular sense before the nineteenth century — and imagination as a passive, 
inferior, or as Samuel Johnson put it, ‘vagrant faculty,’ was very much the hegemonic 
discourse until the arrival of Romantic discourse in the closing decades of the 
eighteenth century.vi  
 
This paper argues that the discourse of creativity is more recent and complex than 
Williams’ hugely influential account allows. Moreover, there is a strong sense in which 
Williams’ text needs to be read historically, as a product of the rapid expansion of the 
discourse of creativity through the decades of the 1950s and 1960s — as a work that 
seeks to celebrate the arrival of a concept that ‘we should be glad of,’ as Williams puts 
it, rather than to cast a critical eye over its uses and origins.vii The paper also seeks to 
highlight the ways in which recent studies undertaken in the context of the creative 
industries phenomenon have continued to portray the cultural historical narrative as one 
of increasing perfection. Creativity, in such accounts, is something that is seen to pre-
exist both the naming and, indeed, the thinking or understanding of the concept. For 
example, Williams’ historical narrative is one in which certain exemplary writers come 
successively ‘very near to’ recognizing creativity for what it isviii — and more recently, 
for Negus and Pickering, this cultural blindness is coupled with resistance, so that it is 
only in the late nineteenth century that ‘creativity could be explicitly named as such’.ix 
The problem is not just the way in which the recent flurry of creative industries 
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narratives overlook developments in cultural historiography as it has been debated and 
practiced for the last thirty years (tending towards an old-fashioned presentation of 
narratives in which ideas are transmitted in unbroken lines from one ‘great man’ to the 
next, with little attempt to grapple with the problem of audience, or to look for their 
alleged origins in the world beyond the arts) — but also, these proliferating narratives or 
‘myths of origin’ have the effect of eliding alternate paradigms and ideas of process that 
could more productively inform the contemporary debate. 
 
Rob Pope’s Creativity: Theory, History, Practice provides an interesting example, in 
particular his chapter ‘Defining Creativity Historically’, an extract of which was 
subsequently presented to the UK Parliamentary Committee on Creative Partnerships.x 
Despite the inclusion within the book of a number of fashionably theoretical chapters 
composed of lists or fragments, and the slightly ponderous implications of the sections 
that bookend the work, viz. ‘ … before the beginning’ and ‘ … after the end’, Pope’s 
chapter on history almost exactly replicates the linear arguments of his sources, which 
tend to be narrowly dependant on the etymology cited in the Oxford English Dictionary 
and Raymond Williams’ Keywords. Hence Williams argues that the history of creativity 
from the medieval to the modern era is one of increasing ‘emphasis on human activity’xi 
and Pope echoes that it was ‘gradually and fitfully’ that a ‘human sense of agency’ crept 
into the meaning of the word ‘create’.xii 
 
Although Pope characterises his history as ‘fitful’, there is actually little that is fitful or 
disruptive in his narrative, which is one in which ‘much more positive’xiii links and 
‘firm’xiv associations are made down the centuries, and in which all roads and citations 
lead smoothly to a climax in the present. Also problematic is the way in which Pope’s 
argument presupposes a direct equivalence between the history of the word and the 
history of the idea — so much so, that his method appears to be one of extracting 
citations from the Oxford English Dictionary and matching them to printed sources. 
There is little if any elaboration of the cultural historical context of the citations he uses, 
or any attempt to question the methodology that underpins the OED’s selections. 
Ultimately, the problem inherent in Pope’s work is best summed up in the chapter’s title 
— the way that Pope embarks on his project with the intention of ‘defining creativity’,xv 
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posing an ideal signification in the present for which he then constructs an alleged 
origin in the past.  
 
The history mapped out in John Hartley’s introduction to Creative Industries is beset 
with similar difficulties, although in this case the historical narrative runs not to an apex 
but to nadir.xvi In this instance Hartley draws on art historian John Barrell’s influential 
study of eighteenth century British paintingxvii to anchor the idea of creativity in the 
discourse of civic humanism — characterized as a patrician or aristocratic discourse that 
Hartley’s work attempts to subvert with the aim of ‘re-purposing’ creativity, ‘bringing it 
into closer contact with the realities of contemporary commercial democracies’.xviii In 
Hartley’s history, the word ‘creative’ is designated as a term ‘associated with the 
subsidised or sponsored public arts … espoused by people like the Earl of Shaftesbury 
and Sir Joshua Reynolds’. He explains that in Reynolds’ theory of art, ‘paintings 
conveyed abstract ideas about moral values and civic virtues’ and are therefore to be 
included in the ‘skill-set of government’.xix According to Hartley, this is why the 
creative arts have been progressively gathered into ‘national institutions, museums and 
galleries for the civic education of the public’. Hartley underscores the anti-elitist aspect 
of his argument by invoking Shaftesbury’s statement that ‘the mere Vulgar of 
Mankind’, who could not ‘act virtuously out of public spirit’, stood in need of ‘such a 
rectifying Object as the Gallows before their Eyes’, and wittily concludes: 
 
Instead of slavish obedience, the increasingly sovereign [ie. 
democratic capitalist] ‘Vulgar of Mankind’ were to be taught self-
control, and they would learn it via the ‘rectifying Object’, not of the 
Gallows but of Art.xx 
 
The nadir of Hartley’s argument is signaled by the way in which he positions creative 
art as a form of disciplinary power or social control. But in the wake of the nadir (as in 
the classic form of the story), a clear dramatic arc begins to emerge, and the rest of the 
argument proceeds smoothly through crisis, to climax and resolution (or ‘repurposing’, 
as Hartley puts it) in the self fulfilling prophecy of the creative industries agenda that is 
laid out in rest of the book.  
 
 5 
Hartley’s, albeit, briefly articulated, history is deeply problematic not least for the way 
in which he universalises Barrell’s argument — taking a historically specific 
engagement with the language of civic humanism and generalising it into an abstract 
ideal quite separate from the historical ground of its enunciation. In short, he strips 
Barrell’s argument of both geography and history. Civic humanism is, after all, a term 
derived from historiography, coined by the German historian Hans Baron in the second 
quarter of the twentieth century to characterize a cluster of social and political 
phenomena in Renaissance Florence. The term was subsequently taken up in the work 
of the Cambridge School historians J.G.A. Pocock and Quentin Skinner, from whose 
work it gradually entered into debates about pre-revolutionary America, and into 
political philosophy through the work of Hannah Arendt. In popular usage, the phrase 
civic humanism is used to designate a form of ideological opposition to liberalism 
construed as rampant individualism or enlightened greed. It is best understood not as a 
reference to a particular form of government (republican, democratic or oligarchic, for 
example), but as a rhetoric that evokes a political and cultural condition — a model of 
active citizenship in which ‘liberty’ is characterized as the (positive) freedom of citizens 
to expand the virtues inherent in them through participation in society, as opposed to the 
classic liberal idea of (negative) liberty construed as immunity from interference with a 
citizen’s capacity to do whatever they will. It seems to be essential to the functioning of 
the discourse that civic humanism is understood as historical — that it conjures up a 
vanished past in which these richer forms of citizenship actually existed. Hence Nikolas 
Rose argues that the key theme of civic humanist literature is its ‘tragic tone’ — that it 
operates via a logic of nostalgia that tells us that ‘the citizenship we have today is 
merely a hollow shell of this real and authentic form’.xxi 
 
Hartley’s evocation of civic humanism as a rhetorical response to ‘creativity’ is 
intriguing and significant, in that it allows him to associate ‘creativity’ with the idea of 
decaying aristocracy, and then, via a rhetorical sleight of hand, to recuperate both 
creativity and a kind of repackaged humanism in which the aristocratic barriers of class 
and inherited privilege are replaced by the free play of the market. This rhetorical 
gesture might even be viewed as eccentric except that Hartley is far from being the only 
creative industries academic to make such connections. For example, Terry Flew has 
sought to substitute not just the idea, but the actual word ‘creativity’ for the concept of 
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the ‘humanities’ — creativity being, as Flew puts it, a new kind of ‘humanism which 
does not possess the baggage of earlier forms of liberal humanism’.xxii But to return to 
the historic claims of Hartley’s argument, it clearly needs to be acknowledged that the 
republic of taste advocated by the likes of Shaftsbury was undemocratic, but also that it 
was pre-democratic. In short, democracy in the guise of universal suffrage or the 
welfare state — not to mention the key terms ‘creativity’ and ‘civic humanism’ that 
anchor his argument — were not actually invented for a further two hundred years.  
 
In attempting to ‘repurpose’ the history of creativity as a platform for their respective 
versions of the creative industries, Hartley, Flew and Pope, and, indeed, Negus and 
Pickering, succumb to the temptation of writing history backwards — an approach that 
effectively transforms historical figures into ‘heralds’ or ‘harbingers‘ for contemporary 
ideals or dispenses with them altogether. The problems here are not merely the 
traditional historical ones of anachronism and prolepsis, but also one of elision in that 
what gets left out is the incredible variety of ideas about art, culture and the concept of 
human ‘making’ that have materialized through the centuries. For this reason, these 
works should not be understood as critical or explanatory histories, but as ‘myths of 
origin’ that are designed to promote (or, at best, think through) a specific institutional 
agenda in the present. This paper is part of a larger project that responds to this 
challenge by attempting, as Hayden White recently advocated, to return past events ‘to 
their presents, to their living relations to their conditions of possibility’.xxiii It is only by 
refusing the trap of producing historical narratives based on contemporary assessments 
of significance that it becomes possible to explore the ways in which the very different 
ideas about art or writing practice embedded in the past might be used to inform and 
rework the future. 
 
A Short History of Un-Creative Art 
 
One of the problems associated with the historical study of art practice is that the 
cultural context of production is often unwittingly erased when historical artefacts are 
contemplated as ‘Art’ in the white space of the museum or gallery, or indeed the lecture 
theatre, or ubiquitous coffee table volume, so that angels cut from an altar screen, for 
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example, or a portrait pried off the side of a municipal chest, are physically rearticulated 
in the exhibition space, and symbolically rearticulated within a very different system for 
the creation and reception of art. The consequence of this rearticulation is that the 
values of the modern system of the arts tend to operate as an invisible standard against 
which all such objects are judged or interpreted.  
 
For example, there was no word equivalent in meaning to ‘create’ in Ancient Greek, the 
Greek word for art was techne, commonly translated as ‘to make’ or ‘the making of 
things, according to rules’.xxiv In contrast to the modern idea of art being something that 
is conjured out of nothing (with results arriving in an ‘inexplicable’ or ‘supernatural’ 
manner, according to a current OED definition of genius), the Greeks understood art as 
a practice that could be taught and learnt. More significantly, techne could be — and 
was — applied to all forms of human endeavour from verse making to shipbuilding or 
bricklaying, so long as it was performed with grace. This ancient concept of art, or ars 
as the Romans were later to call it, can be seen in contemporary expressions such as the 
art of cooking or the art of winemaking — the remnants of an older usage before 
European culture created art and craft as antonyms for one another. In this sense, it 
should also be noted that the opposite of techne was not art, but nature. 
 
The middle ages inherited the classical idea of art practice, and continued to consider art 
as a characteristic of reason. For Thomas Aquinas, art was the ‘right rule of reason’, or 
‘[rational knowledge] of things to be made’.xxv Aquinas also extended the term ars to 
include a broad range of productive activities, so that stonemasons and cobblers were 
practised in art in the same way as painters and poets. Also significant is the way in 
which Aquinas separated the arts into the useful and pleasurable categories, rating the 
functional forms of art more highly than the decorative. Poetry was considered 
functional because it provided instruction, and painting was considered functional in 
that it provided instruction for those who could not read or write. In this sense, art was 
understood to have a functional or didactic rather than a revelatory or purely aesthetic 
end. This is not because medieval society failed to delight in beautiful objects. Rather, it 
was because style was not deemed to be separable from content in the systematic way 
that it is in the modern world. Beauty was identified with the good, and beauty and 
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functionality were inextricably related, so that one was inconceivable without the other. 
As Aquinas famously argued: 
 
Thus, for instance, when a man makes himself a saw for the 
purpose of cutting, he makes it of iron, which is suitable for the 
object in view; and he does not prefer to make it of glass, though 
this be a more beautiful material, because this very beauty 
would be an obstacle to the end he has in view.xxvi 
 
Aquinas’s saw eloquently demonstrates the relationship between beauty, utility and 
moral value that informed the medieval ideal — an art practice founded on the concept 
of harmony between things and their functions, in which creativity in its contemporary 
sense played no part. The problem is that once this difference is rearticulated within a 
modern system of value the works seem diminished, so that even such a partial critic as 
Umberto Eco finds it necessary to apologise for the very different ideas about art 
practice to be found in the middle ages, scattering phrases such as ‘we must be careful 
not to find too much fault with it’xxvii or ‘one cannot really cavil’xxviii through the length 
of an otherwise wonderful exploration of the medieval ideal. At best, such qualifications 
imply that art was historically undervalued because it was deemed mechanical — mere 
craft, as opposed to Creation — or because it was carried out in the political and 
economic context of urban construction, or produced by collectives of anonymous 
artists via a system of paid commissions, or regulated as a trade through a system of 
guilds. Alternatively, a perspective less clouded by contemporary systems of value 
might seek to understand the middle ages as a period in which the system of art was 
integrated at many more social and economic levels — as an age in which the 
constructive nature of art was better valued by artists, or in which critics appeared to 
appreciate the artistic element in all forms of human making. In this sense, it may well 
be that the contemporary valorisation of creativity, of the artist as loner/outsider — in 
short, the ideal of a purer realm of art unsullied by economic or political imperatives — 
though superficially beguiling, is wilfully blind to its own ideological compromises, and 
impoverished for this reason. 
 
Art and the Reproductive Imagination 
 9 
 
Perhaps the first European philosopher to explain art with reference to the imagination 
was Francis Bacon (better known as the father of scientific method), who divided 
knowledge into the three human faculties of memory, reason and imagination, with the 
three ‘great branches’ of human learning finding typical expression in each — history 
under memory, philosophy under reason, and poetry under imagination. For this reason, 
Bacon is often credited with effecting the separation between reason and imagination 
that gave rise to the modern understanding of imagination — an understanding that the 
term creativity was later to encapsulate. In writing and literary studies both Dawson and 
Engell give eloquent accounts of this development, while Pope inverts the premise to 
make a negative argument out of the same basic story.xxix However, a more critical 
approach reveals that the emergence of the concept of ‘creative imagination’ is more 
troubling than such tidy narratives allow. 
 
In the sixteenth century imagination was a contentious subject. Once again, there had 
been no word for imagination in Ancient Greek. The closest Greek term was 
phantasma, which carries a more general sense of ‘how things appear’, such as the way 
the sun appears deceptively small from the vantage of the earth, or the land appears to 
rock from the vantage of a rowing boat. Hence Plato argued that imagination — 
conceived as images, appearances or copies of things — worked to seduce the mind 
away from reason. Aristotle, by contrast, understood mental images as the means by 
which the sensory world connects to reason, and though prone to error and illusion, 
Aristotle suggested that images nevertheless assisted reason in its proper function. The 
medieval scholastics continued to distrust imagination and stressed the need for 
imagination to be kept subordinate to reason lest it lead its owner astray. Bonaventure 
expressed concern that imagination abetted demonic possession, and Aquinas famously 
wrote, ‘Demons are known to work on imagination, until everything is other than it 
is’.xxx 
 
Imagination in Bacon’s theory of the mental faculties played a markedly different role. 
For Bacon, imagination acts as a messenger between reason and the will. It draws 
images from sensory data that the body has received and submits them to the rule of 
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reason. ‘Neither is the imagination simply and only a messenger,’ he wrote, ‘but it is 
either invested with or usurps no small authority in itself, besides the simple duty of the 
message.’xxxi Significantly, this ‘small authority’ did not inevitably lead to error or 
delusion. Rather, Bacon argued that imagination is what transforms the prosaic ‘what 
has happened’ into ‘what may or should happen’ through the idealizing process. Poetry 
is given a special place in Bacon’s scheme because it invents more heroic deeds or 
examples of vice and virtue than those found in nature, and for this reason is ‘ever 
thought to have some participation of divineness, because it doth raise the mind, by 
submitting the shows of things to the desires of the mind.’xxxii  
 
Moreover, the special place that Bacon grants to poetry should not be seen as 
inconsistent with the thrust of his famous scientific method, as critics such as Pope have 
argued.xxxiii The mistake is in the attempt to understand the aim of Bacon’s method as 
‘objectivity’ or even ‘objectivity in the making’ (which is then contrasted with 
‘creativity’ or ‘creativity in the making’), for in the sixteenth century ‘objectivity’ was 
an un-invented concept. Rather, the aim of Bacon’s method is better understood as a 
form of self-distancing in which the new cautioning of the mind, to use Bacon’s own 
phrase, served a purely instrumental function — the conquest/exploitation of nature by 
man in the service of God and sovereign.  
 
In other words, imagination is not opposed to reason as such, but is encouraged in so far 
as it remains subordinate to this larger instrumental function. This is why, as Foucault 
has argued, Bacon does not attempt to dissipate the false resemblances generated by the 
imagination by means of logic or evidence. Rather, he shows them as idols — 
‘shimmering before our eyes, vanishing as one draws near, then reforming again a 
moment later, a little further off’.xxxiv Thus the curiously named ‘Idols of the Tribe’, 
‘Idols of the Cave’, and ‘Idols of the Market’. Bacon’s work does not represent a 
decisive break with the pattern of sixteenth century thought — for example, the idea of 
a full universe proceeding from multiplicity to unity epitomized by the Great Chain of 
Being rising in ascending order from insects to angles. But, as Dr Thomas Sprat put it in 
his history of the Royal Society, it was the task of the new method to ‘follow all the 
Links of this Chain, till all their Secrets are open to our Minds, and their Works 
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advanced or imitated by our Hands. This is truly to command the World … ’xxxv 
Bacon’s new method does not represent a break with the prevailing regime of 
knowledge, but as Foucault puts it, ‘sixteenth century thought becoming troubled as it 
contemplates itself’.xxxvi 
 
Interestingly enough, although Bacon categorises the production of poetry under 
imagination, he does not include the whole of what we now call the creative arts in the 
same category. This is because the modern system of the arts (the idea of literature, 
painting and sculpture as a discrete field of endeavour linked by the human imagination) 
did not emerge until the mid-eighteenth century. In fact, it was not long after Bacon 
proposed his three categories of knowledge that his former pupil Thomas Hobbes put 
forward an entirely different system of classification — placing poetry together with 
mineralogy, optics and ethics on the one hand, and architecture together with astronomy 
and navigation on the other.xxxvii Of greater significance to the history of art practice 
was the way in which Hobbes reorganized Bacon’s distinction between imagination (or 
‘wit’, as the eighteenth century was to call it) and reason (or ‘judgment’), a distinction 
that was to shape artistic and philosophical debates over the course of the next century.  
 
The most common understanding of imagination in the seventeenth century was not in 
the form of Bacon’s wayward ‘messenger’, but as the more prosaic capacity to 
reproduce images that enter the mind through the senses, primarily with reference to 
visual images that enter through the eye. Hobbes, for example, defined imagination as 
‘decaying sense,’ a phrase conceived not so much as a pejorative than literal description 
of the condition of the mind after the remembered object is removed.xxxviii According to 
this view, man did not generate anything new from within the mind, but merely 
reproduced or recombined previously perceived objects, processes that Hobbes named 
simple and compound imagination, ‘as when from the sight of a man at one time, and of 
a horse at another, we conceive in our mind a Centaure’.xxxix Reason, by contrast, 
depends on the apprehension of difference. For Hobbes, it is the process of 
discrimination through which ‘men attaine to exact and perfect knowledge’ by 
‘discerning suddainely dissimilitude in thinges that otherwise appeare the same’.xl 
Reason is the faculty that provides access to truth and the ‘similitudes’ of imagination 
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are not only considered less reliable than the products of reason, but are also deemed 
capable of inducing delusion. Hobbes was not alone in his fulminations against 
imagination. For example, Nicolas Malebranche, a one-time pupil of Rene Descartes, 
argued that imagination led directly to depravity: 
 
For the better the Imagination is furnish’d, the more 
dangerous it is; great qualities in the Eyes of Men, are the 
most prolifick and the most general causes of the 
blindness of the Mind and the corruption of the Heart.xli 
 
The popular eighteenth century science writer Henry Barker (author of ‘The Microscope 
Made Easy’) took a milder view, but remained thoroughly suspicious in his attitude, 
arguing: 
 
Tis not then a Defect, absolutely speaking, to have a 
strong, quick, and fine Imagination; since it is of so great a 
help to Reason. But ’tis a very great Fault to pervert the 
Order of Nature, to make Reason wait upon Imagination, 
to prefer and delight only in this, and, by a shameful 
Injustice, carry it as it were in Triumph, and place it in the 
Seat of Reason, which we almost intirely darken and 
eclipse.xlii 
 
Even as inspiration for artistic activity imagination was profoundly distrusted. Art was 
considered to be the product of reason, and imagination was only believed to be 
important to the degree that it gave substance to insight. Hobbes famously articulated 
his vision of the writing process in the following terms, ‘Experience begets memory; 
Memory begets Judgment and Fancy: Judgment begets the strength and structure, and 
Fancy begets the ornaments of a Poem’.xliii Or as the poet John Dryden was later to put 
it, ‘if this fancy not be regulated, it is mere caprice, and utterly incapable to produce a 
reasonable and judicious poem’.xliv 
 
The examples are easily multiplied: Descartes’ characterized imagination as ‘la folle du 
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logis,’xlv Johnson dubbed it a ‘vagrant faculty,’xlvi Locke associated it with 
‘enthusiasm’, which ‘takes away both Reason and Revelation, and substitutes in the 
room of it, the ungrounded Fancies of a Man’s own Brain’.xlvii Likewise, Davenant 
called inspiration a ‘dangerous word,’xlviii Johnson labeled it a ‘mental disease’,xlix 
Joshua Reynolds declared it a ‘Phantom’,l and Hobbes memorably wrote that the 
concept of the creative Muse is the imitation of a foolish custom, ‘by which a man, 
enabled to speak wisely from the principles of Nature and his own meditations, loves 
rather to be thought to speak by inspiration, like a Bagpipe’.li  
 
The logic that underpins eighteenth century discourse is qualitatively different from that 
of earlier periods, in that it does not seek merely to delimit knowledge (to exclude 
thinking based on imagination in order to keep knowledge ‘error free’, as Bacon had 
proposed), but rather to condemn imagination as confusion, as a jumble of images that 
needed to be catalogued in terms of difference and order — or, as Foucault argued, by 
‘universalizing it and thereby giving it its purest form’.lii In short, rather than stating, as 
Williams does, that the eighteenth century was the period in which creative imagination 
‘with its key-word, ‘imagination’, was becoming paramount’,liii or that the eighteenth 
century is the period in which ‘a positive link is forged’ between creativity and human 
agency, as Pope proposesliv — it might be better to characterize the eighteenth century 
imagination as epistemic. For art was concerned with an entirely different aim — to 
know. Classical art aimed to produce the true, the believable, and the probable. 
Originality was understood only in the sense of typicality — of art’s proximity to the 
great Original, which was Nature. Hence, the Augustan emphasis on order was not the 
product of a mechanical aesthetic, but a reflection of the perceived harmony of the 
classical universe. Once again, in the light of such aims, creativity, originality, and 
innovation as we understand them, not to mention the feelings of the artist and his 
artistic self-expression, were entirely irrelevant. 
 
In finding evidence to support his argument Williams (and, following his lead, Negus 
and Pickering, Dawson and Pope), makes the claim that in 1728 the minor Scottish poet 
David Mallet was the first to apply the modern concept of creativity to the powers of the 
poet.lv The source for the claim is a quotation from Mallet’s The Excursion, in particular 
Mallet’s opening line ‘Muse, Creative Power, IMAGINATION!’ However, it ought to 
 14 
be noted that Mallet makes use of the word creative in the context of invoking the 
poetic muse, a traditional device used to signal that a writer was working within a given 
poetic tradition, according to fixed rules. There are in fact several earlier examples of 
the word ‘creative’ used in the context of the hymnic tradition (for example, the poet 
John Hopkins invokes his Muse’s gifts: ‘You, like creative Heav’n your Labours 
frame;/You spoke the Word and at your Breath they came’).lvi Read in this context, it is 
unclear whether Mallet intended his invocation as a decisive break with the hymnic 
tradition. It is also unclear whether Mallet intended the word creative to signify a human 
rather than divine or muse-like attribute.  
 
Moreover, the version of the poem quoted in the above-mentioned studies is taken from 
the radically revised 1743 edition of The Excursion, and not the original 1728 edition 
(as cited), which actually read: 
 
FANCY, creative Power, at whose Command  
Arise unnumber'd Images of Things,  
Thy hourly Offspring; Thou whose mighty Will  
Peoples with airy Shapes the Pathless Vale 
Where pensive Meditation loves to stray 
Fancy, with me range Earth’s extended Space 
Surveying Nature’s Works.lvii 
 
The 1728 work falls more naturally within the tradition of the invocation, with the poet 
asking his muse ‘Fancy’ to be his companion on a journey. In the more commonly cited 
1743 version, the balance shifts and imagination becomes a more impressive player in 
the poem. Thus, 
 
Companion of the muse, creative power,  
IMAGINATION! at whose great command,  
Arise unnumber'd images of things,  
Thy hourly offspring: thou, who canst at will 
People with air-born shapes the silent wood, 
And solitary veil, thy own domain, 
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Where Contemplation haunts; O come invok’d, 
To waft me on thy many-tinctur’d wing 
O’er EARTH’s extended space:lviii 
 
The changes would seem to suggest that Mallet welcomed a more radical interpretation 
of his work, given the emphasis he gives to the word ‘IMAGINATION,’ for example. 
However, Mallet’s description of the poem as laid out in the ‘Argument’ continues to 
make it clear that the invocation is ‘addressed to Fancy’ — that it is Fancy and not the 
poet who is creative, using her heavenly power to waft the poet on her ‘many-tinctur’d 
wing’.  
 
Other than Mallet’s use of the adjective there seems little in The Excursion to 
differentiate it from the work of his contemporaries, and less to suggest that the use of 
the adjective signals a new epistemic relationship to imagination. Indeed The Excursion 
belongs, together with James Thomson’s better known To the Memory of Sir Issac 
Newton, to a sizable genre of eighteenth century poetry devoted to Newton’s Principia 
and Opticks, which in the words of literary critic M.H. Abrams it ‘joyously pillag[es]’.lix 
Far from being innovative, Abrams characterizes the genre as the product of an 
illustrative process, via which the ‘truth’ of Newton’s Opticks is turned into poetry 
through a process of ornamentation — an illustrating of its statements — rather than 
creating things afresh. In other respects, The Excursion retains the Classical period’s 
concern with the external world (as opposed to, for example, the idea of creative self 
expression). It is heavily influenced by the Gothic and Picturesque (elements that are 
also far more marked in the 1743 edition), but these elements are strongly framed in the 
context of an ordered Classical universe, in which the rainbow, for example, is deemed 
more poetic for having been demystified by Newton’s ‘pure intelligence’ and ‘mind’s 
clear vision’ into a vision of ‘ideal harmony’.lx In short, an equally tenable 
interpretation of the poem would place it as yet another example of imagination enlisted 
in the service of reason. 
 
Joseph Addison is another eighteenth century writer whose work is commonly invoked 
to support claims about the flourishing of the discourse of creativity in that period, and 
his use of the divine analogy ‘Imagination ... has in it something like creation’ is 
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enlisted in the arguments of Pope, Engell and Dawson among others.lxi However, in 
‘The Pleasures of the Imagination’, the essay from which this citation is taken, Addison 
goes on to suggest that the faculty of imagination is actually less refined than the faculty 
of reason. He argues that reason searches for hidden causes, while imagination is 
content to passively experience things. For Addison, this is why the pleasures of 
imagination are more easily acquired than those of reason. He writes: 
 
A beautiful Prospect delights the Soul, as much as a 
Demonstration; and a Description in Homer has charmed more 
Readers than a Chapter in Aristotle. Besides, the Pleasures of 
the Imagination have this Advantage, above those of the 
Understanding, that they are more obvious, and more easie to be 
acquired. It is but opening the Eye, and the Scene enters. The 
Colours paint themselves on the Fancy, with very little Attention 
of Thought or Application of the Mind in the Beholder. We are 
struck, we know not how, with the Symmetry of any thing we 
see, and immediately assent to the Beauty of an Object, without 
enquiring into the particular Causes and Occasions of it.lxii 
 
According to Addison, seeing a landscape or reading about one affects us equally — 
both require remarkably little effort; just an ‘opening [of] the Eye’. Though Addison’s 
essay is justifiably famous for the way in which it collects the imaginative arts together 
(a new concept for the eighteenth century), the imagination it describes remains 
profoundly passive. Thus, the ‘scene enters’, ‘colors paint’, we are ‘struck … with the 
Symmetry’ and ‘immediately assent’. Collectively Addison’s essays on the imagination 
work to suggest that the imagination is not serious, rather it ‘bestows charms’, offers ‘a 
kind of refreshment’ or ‘ornament’ to the more important work of reason.lxiii 
 
In attempting to create a narrative that reaches as far back into history as possible, the 
studies of creativity examined in this essay tend to miss the fundamental fracture in the 
discourse of the mind that occurs at the end of the eighteenth century — what M.H. 
Abrams once called the ‘Copernican revolution in epistemology’ that was the Romantic 
era.lxiv As Foucault has argued, the shift between the classical episteme and the modern 
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is one in which the structure of knowledge undergoes a fundamental reversal. In the 
course of this reversal, imagination, once regarded as a poor cousin to reason — at best, 
passive, and at worst, a dangerous faculty that led to madness or delusion — becomes 
the primary faculty of the human mind. To overlook this shift is to miss the tension 
between the Enlightenment ideal of the rationally bounded individual and the Romantic 
myth of the unbounded autonomy of the infinite self. It is also to elide the possibility 
that the arrangement of knowledge that gave rise to creativity may well have been that 
which created the modern and anthropological subject — a new arrangement of 
knowledge that created man as the central subject and object of reality.  
 
The Creative Mind 
 
Kant is an obvious figure in this transition. It was Kant who increased the scope of the 
imagination in the theory of knowledge to a revolutionary degree. Just as Copernicus 
reversed the way people thought about the relationship of the earth to the sun, Kant 
reversed the way people thought about the relationship between the mind and the world 
of objects and experience. In a dramatic reversal of both empiricism and rationality he 
argued that some of the properties observed in objects might be due to the nature and 
constitution of the human spectator. Or, as Kant indelibly put it: 
 
Failing of satisfactory progress in explaining the movements 
of the heavenly bodies on the supposition that they all 
revolved around the spectator, [Copernicus] tried whether he 
might not have better success if he made the spectator to 
revolve and the stars to remain at rest.lxv 
 
Kant accepts that knowledge begins with sense experience, but argues that the mind 
applies preexisting categories of perception — including logic, causality, substance, 
space and time — to the object. In this sense, the perceiving mind might be said to 
discover only that which it itself has partly made. With Kant, imagination ceases to be 
an empty storehouse for images generated by the senses, a blank sheet of paper on 
which the imprint of experience is placed, and begins to be understood as active and 
productive. Interestingly enough, it is not long after Kant, that scientists and 
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phrenologists such as F.J. Gall, Charles Bell and Erasmus Darwin begin to elucidate the 
active mind in neurological terms — for the first time locating the mind in the brain, 
and not in the heart, the spinal column, the pineal gland, or the body as a whole.lxvi  
 
In English, Kant’s influence manifested itself in poetry before entering into philosophy. 
In particular, in the work of Samuel Taylor Coleridge imagination is seen to take the 
leap beyond the subject through the act of artistic creation. With Coleridge, the 
imagination ceases to be ‘a lazy Looker-on on an external world’ and is endowed with a 
synthetic or ‘magical’ power.lxvii He describes this new apprehension of imagination as 
a power of knowledge that is a repetition in the subject’s mind of the auto-poetic power 
of God’s creation. Or, in Coleridge’s own words, the imagination is ‘the living Power 
and prime Agent of all human Perception’ and ‘a repetition in the finite mind of the 
eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM’.lxviii This statement of the artist’s auto-poetic 
power is qualitatively different from, and therefore historically discontinuous with, the 
tradition of the divine analogy — that is, the many statements likening the poet to a 
‘second Maker’ that form the subject matter of so many histories of creativity, such as, 
for example, the quotation from Tasso that Williams argues is the ‘decisive source of 
the modern meaning’ of the term,lxix and that the literary historian E.N. Tigerstedt has 
extended back to the Florentine poet Christoforo Landino in the fifteenth century.lxx The 
essential difference is that for Coleridge the perceiving mind is seen to be active in 
giving shape and meaning to what is outside it, so that our knowledge of what is outside 
us is also the knowledge of ourselves. Hence, Coleridge calls this new creative power 
both a self-manifestation and self-discovery because we see ourselves through the 
structure of our own minds.  
 
It is following Kant and the Romantics that creative imagination comes to be seen as the 
‘true source of genius’ and the ‘basis of originality’, words which themselves gain a 
new meaning. Genius is distinguished from mere talent, and redefined as a quality of 
mind that makes rules instead of following them, and the art object comes to be 
understood as the embodiment of original aesthetic ideals that are the product of the 
artist’s creative imagination, not mere reflections, imitations, or perfections of truths 
found elsewhere. The emergent discourse also needs to be understood as a product of 
the new system of the arts arising in the eighteenth century, with its now familiar 
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dualities of art/craft, aesthetic/purpose, genius/talent, creative/mechanical, which can be 
usefully mapped through the shifting definitions provided in the French Encyclopédie 
between 1751 and 1780.lxxi The consequence of this reorganisation is that art is 
effectively created as a separate realm of human endeavour standing above and outside 
the rest of social and economic life. For this reason, Marx argued that ‘The exclusive 
concentration of artistic talent in particular individuals, and its suppression in the broad 
mass which is bound up with this, is a consequence of the division of labour’, 
attributing an economic origin to the process through which the older idea of art as 
construction is replaced by a system that devalues the work of the artisan as a manual 
worker, and revalues the work of the artist via a cult of mystification.lxxii Also relevant 
is the way in which the new discourse intersects with the artist’s bid for respectability, 
driven by the artist’s new reliance on the vagaries of the market as traditional patronage 
systems collapse. There is an emerging sense in which artists ‘add value’ to their work 
by placing art beyond value. 
 
The new discourse affects both the creation of art and its reception. Creative art is 
arranged in the contemplative spaces of the recently invented art museum, a centre that 
also becomes a storehouse for imperial plunder. In the same way, the cannon of English 
literature appears on the university curriculum for the very first time (for example, 
Oxford University did not introduce English Literature as a subject until 1875), just as 
music moves out of church and salon into the rarified spaces of the concert hall. The 
new discourse is also edged with a strange nationalistic fervor, and it is not coincidental 
that the OED’s earliest citation of the noun ‘creativity’ occurs in the context of a chapter 
on Shakespeare as the English national poet written by a German-educated historian, 
with my own research locating earlier citations in historical works influenced by the 
prevailing nationalist/racialist interpretation of Herder. It is from this dense cultural 
matrix that the concept of creativity actually emerges. It a strange and remarkable birth 
— one that eclipses a two thousand year old tradition of art practice — and occurs in an 
age that prided itself on its scientific spirit, but saw fit to endow the practice of writing 
on paper or painting on canvas with mystical attributes. 
 
Hence, ‘Reason is to imagination as the instrument to the agent, as the body to the 
spirit, as the shadow to the substance,’ wrote Shelley in a sentence that reverses many 
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centuries of European thought.lxxiii For Wordsworth, the mind is ‘creator and receiver 
both’ and human imagination ‘Is but another name for absolute power/And clearest 
insight, amplitude of mind,/And reason in her most exalted mood’.lxxiv John Ruskin 
addressed himself to objects that bore the impress of ‘highest creative life that is to say 
the mind of man’lxxv William Hazlitt located ‘this creative impulse, this plastic power’ 
in works of art from Chaucer to Shakespeare.lxxvi Thomas Carlyle extended the term to 
other professions, finding an ‘active power’, ‘creative instinct’ or dynamic force in all 
kinds of human production,lxxvii and popular newspapers of the period were as likely to 
invoke the ‘creative power’ of industry, as they were to invoke the creative powers of 
the poet. It is also during this period that statements of a qualitatively different order are 
to be found, including Benjamin Disraeli’s assertion that ‘man is made to create,’lxxviii 
Marx’s argument that human happiness lies in a ‘positive, creative activity,’lxxix 
Matthew Arnold’s claim that ‘a free creative activity is the true function of man,’lxxx and 
Frederic Nietzsche’s argument that it is ‘creative plenipotence’ that separates the 
Ubermensch from the rest of humanity.lxxxi The work of such writers exemplify the shift 
away from the eighteenth century idea of a fixed and immutable universe (as 
exemplified in the mathematical physics of Newton), towards a universe that is 
understood as a continuous process of organic invention — a universe unfolding within 
a metaphysical structure that is malleable enough to impart a new sense of freedom to 
human endeavour. This shift gains its most characteristic expression in Darwin’s theory 
of evolution — and, no less famously, in The Descent of Man, the work in which 
Darwin aligns human imagination with a narrative of continuous novelty or invention, 
formation and transformation, arguing, ‘The imagination is one of the highest 
prerogatives of man. By this faculty he unites, independently of the will, former images 
and ideas, and thus creates brilliant and novel results’.lxxxii In this sense, it might even be 
possible that the discourse of creativity does not originate in art, or the discourse of 
imagination, as is commonly believed, but represents new forms of thought migrating 
into the arts from the emerging biological and life scienceslxxxiii — perhaps reaching full 
expression in works such as those of the philosopher-mathematician Alfred North 
Whitehead, who defined creativity as the process, ‘whereby the actual world has its 
character of temporal passage to novelty’.lxxxiv Or, more forcefully, ‘The creativity of 
the world is the throbbing emotion of the past hurling itself into a new transcendent 
fact.’lxxxv 
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Despite its emphasis on the new, what seems crucial to the functioning of the discourse 
as it flourishes is that ‘creativity’ appear old, that it offer us a mythical history 
stretching back to the first time man applied paint to a cave wall. This illusion is aided 
by the emergence of a new critical vocabulary with which to survey the entire history of 
European art, together with means and opportunity, as art and literature programs 
flourish in the university cloister. In reality, the discourse of creativity is not even two 
hundred years old. It is more likely less — for it is only once creativity is reified and 
named that it makes itself available as an object for scientific study. Once named, it can 
be measured and dissected by psychologists and brain surgeons, and political and 
educational institutions can create policies for its cultivation. In this sense, the important 
period for the formation of the discourse might even be the twentieth century — the 
period in which the discourse becomes codified.  
 
In this respect, my own preliminary research indicates that the abstract noun creativity 
entered into common usage in the US between 1926 and 1953, where it far outstripped 
its then minimal usage in the United Kingdom. The growing popularity of the term was 
accompanied by a dramatic shift in the contents of the discourse, so that creativity 
ceases to be understood as the preserve of genius, but is located in all kinds of people 
and human endeavours. The American ideal is exemplified in the work of the 
advertising impresario Alex Osborn and his wildly successful bestseller, Applied 
Imagination — a work that is inflected with a particular American character, combining 
ideas of ‘uplift’ with ideas of accessibility and the concept of the ‘common man’. In this 
sense, Osborne’s work draws implicitly and explicitly on the ideas of the pragmatic 
philosopher John Dewey, whose work influenced the cultural activities of the Federal 
Arts Program under Roosevelt’s New Deal, the Progressive Education Movement (of 
which the creative writing movement is an enduring legacy), and the work of others 
including the psycho-educationalist Hughes Mearns at the Chicago Laboratory School. 
The significance of Osborn is that he radically transfigures these ideas in order to make 
them compatible with a specifically nationalist enunciation of entrepreneurial capital. 
 
The decades of the 1950s and 1960s saw an unprecedented proliferation of institutes 
and foundations devoted to the fostering of creativity in the US, a phenomena that J.P. 
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Guilford, dubbed the ‘father’ of creativity studies in psychology, allegedly attributed to 
the massive redirection of funds from the US defence budget in the wake of the 
‘Sputnik Shock’ — the US, it was feared, was losing the Space Race because its 
scientists were not ‘creative’ enough. Shortly afterwards, Paul Torrance invented the 
Torrance Test (the ‘creative’ equivalent of the IQ test) to measure creativity in 
American children, an estimated one trillion dollars flooded into tertiary education 
institutions through the National Defense Education Act, Osborn’s Creative Education 
Foundation received contracts from the US Air Force, and Guilford’s research at the 
University of Southern California was funded by the US Navy. These government-
sponsored initiatives shifted the focus of the discourse once again — this time onto the 
identification and study of individuals and individual traits as a means to combat Soviet 
totalitarianism, but mobilizing those traits within a framework that placed emphasis on 
organizational and structural optimization, which is the most likely antecedent of 
creativity theories in organization and business studies today. Significantly, it is also in 
the decade of the 1950s that the Anglo-American word ‘creativity’ is imported into 
European languages, such as French and German.lxxxvi 
 
In Short … 
 
The real issue that needs to be brought to light in any study of creativity is not the 
history of the growing perfection of the concept, or a cultural shift from blindness to 
recognition, but its conditions of possibility. Creativity is an invention brought about by 
a particular arrangement of knowledge — and as Foucault famously argued with respect 
to the arrangement of knowledge that saw the birth of the humanist subject: 
 
If those arrangements were to disappear as they appeared, 
if some event of which we can at the moment do no more 
than sense the possibility — without knowing either what 
its form will be or what it promises — were to cause them 
to crumble, as the ground of Classical thought did, at the 
end of the eighteenth century, then one can certainly 
wager that man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand 
at the edge of the sea.lxxxvii 
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It is perhaps unlikely that the term creativity will be ‘erased’ any time soon. However, 
by denaturalizing the discourse — by questioning the ‘common sense’ appeals of 
creative industries rhetoric and the romantic appeals of the creative arts — we can begin 
to understand the multiple and contradictory ways in which the idea of creativity is 
deployed in the present. For example, the way in which creativity can sustain a focus on 
social innovation, as in Florida, and personal self-expression, as in Julia Cameron’s 
popular self-help books; the way in which creativity can be directed towards the 
cultivation of ‘great leaders,’ as Simonton proposes, or the ‘power’ and ‘freedom’ of 
‘mass creativity,’ as Leadbeater assertslxxxviii — and at the same time the 9/11 
Commission Report can state that it is ‘crucial to find a way of routinizing, even 
bureaucractizing, the exercise of imagination’ and the US House Select Committee on 
Intelligence can call hearings to discuss the Commission’s ‘requirement for imagination 
and creativity’ in the US intelligence service.lxxxix 
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